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GEORGE H. PATTERSON, Official '
Broker of Intermountain Land and
Livestock Company, and WILLANA
C. PATTERSON, doing business aS'
Intermountain Land arid· · Livestock
Company,
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Case No.
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JAMES BLAIR and NETA:· BLAIR,
his wife,
Defendants and Respondents

BR.IEF OF RESPONDENTS
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Attorney for Respondents·.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
S1_~ATE OF UTAH

GEORG.E H. PATTERSON, Official
Broker of Intermountain Land and
Livestock Company, and WILLANA
C. PATTERSON, doing business aS'
Intermountain Land and Livestock
Company,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

Case No.
7948

vs.
JAMES BLAIR and NET A BLAIR,
his wife,
Defendants and Respondents

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATE'MENT OF FACTS
Respondents do not agree with the statement of facts
made by the appellants, except in the following particulars: It
is not disputed that the defendants executed the agreement,
(Plaintiffs Exhibit ''A''), thereby listing their farm property
near Payson, Utah, for sale by the plaintiffs, through ·Mr.
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Eckersley, agent of the plaintiffs, nor is it disputed that Mr.
Paul Hurst, who later bought the farm of the defendants, and
who bought it less than 12 months after the listing had expired, knew that Mr. Eckersley was a real estate agent. Mr.
Hurst also learned from Mr. Eckersley that he had the farm
of the defendants for sale.
The point of the case is not, as appellants view it, that
the plaintiffs,, by the· casual comment to Mr. Hurst by their
agent that the Blair place was for sale, thereby offered it to
him. The precise point of the case is whether there was sufficient evidence before the jury, from the manner in which, and
the circumst1ances under which, the claimed offer was communicated to Mr. Hurst, together with all the other evidence
presented to the jury, by which they could properly find, as
they did, that the place was not offered for sale to Mr. Hurst.
The evidence clearly shows·:

( 1) That in such efforts as the plaintiffs made to sell
the Blair place they considered it and referred to it as a farm.
(a) It is listed in the listing agreement as, "This is a farm
with extra good cows. With A milk base" (Plaintiffs Exhibit ~~A") ; (b) It was referred to in the plaintiff's advertising in the newspapers as a farm (Tr. 9, line 12, et seq.).
( 2) The efforts of the plaintiff's to sell property to
Mr. Hurst were directed toward selling him a "ranch''.
(a) Mr. Patterson testified of Mr. Eckersley's efforts to sell
1
Mr. Hurst a "ranch" in Montana (Tr. I 1, Lines 1 through
15) : (b) Plaintiff's brought out on cross-examination of Mr.
Hurst that Mr. Eckersley had taken him to Montana ( l~r. 37,
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line 3 and 4) and Wyoming (Tr. 37, lines 23 through 30)
to sell him a ranch.
(3) The plaintiffs made no real effort to sell Mr.
Hurst the Blair farm, nor to interest him in it. (a) Mr.
Eckersley did not even recall having taken Mr. Hurst to the
Blair farm (Tr. 20, lines 3 and 4, lines 23 through 30);
(b) When mention was made by Mr. Eckersley of the fact
that the Blair place was· for sale it was not done for the purpose of favorably interesting Mr. Hurst in the property. The
mention of its being for sale was made in a negative and
derogatory manner (Tr. 29, line 20, et seq.).
( 4) The testimony of Mr. Eckersley attempting to
connect his listing of Mr. Hurst's store for sale with efforts to
sell the Blair place to him is s·o sketchy, general, and nebulous
that it does not really controvert the clear cut testimony of ·Mr.
Hurst that no offer was made to sell him the Blair place.
(a) Mr. Eckersley said Mr. Hurst "intimated" (Tr. 19, lines
17, 18, and 19) that if he could sell the store he would be
interested in other properties Mr. Eckersley had listed; (b) Mr.
Eckersley would not even forthrightly s·ay Mr. -Hurst knew
he was in the real estate business (Tr, 23, lines 13 through
17); (c) Mr. Eckersley was almost apologetic that the matter
had gotten into a lawsuit (Tr. 23, lines 20 and 21).
(5)

~ounsel

for plaintiffs mis-states the facts 1n the

final paragraph of his· brief when he represents that the defendants left the state when they learned they were about to
be sued. The transcript shows that the defendants left to get
Mr. Blair's wife away to a drier climate (Tr. 25, lines 27 and
28). They left Payson on account of Mrs. Blair's rheumatism
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(Tr. 43, line 30). They were 1n San Fernando whe·n they
received word of the claim of plaintiffs for a commission (Tr.
44, lines 24 through 27).

ARGUMENT
I.
The "distress'' which the plaintiffs would have us feel
for them as real esatte brokers would be much more real if
this were an action to recover from some Wyoming or Mon~
tana rancher, over whose place they had flo.wn Mr. Hurst, the
commission to which they would be entitled if Mr. Hurst had
t'hereafter surreptitiously gone back to the rancher and bought
the ranch they had, with so much expenditure for food, auto. mobile rides and hotel lodgings, offered to him. That is not
the situation before us'.
Plaintiffs would have us believe that the proper techniqur
and psychology in selling a ranch where a $5,000.00 commis~
sion, or more, is involved is to make it as attractive, and as
pleasantly and completely viewed and explained, as possible,
but, in triyng to sell a little 70 acre farm in the Payson area
the surest way to interest a man in it is to assume that because he once threshed some grain on it 30 years ago he knows
all about it, and to then advise him that it is a man-killer.
They would have us believe that in their efforts to sell ranches
they go to vast expense "to please the prospective purchaser".
trhey take him for airplane rides to exhibit to him the grazing
"rights", the affirmative virtues of the place, but, in trying to
sell the Blair place they "offer" it to Mr. Hurst by that
"challenging" expedient of telling him it is a man-killer. This
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left-handed method of making an offer was apparently not
found necessary until after they were confronted with the un~
controverted testimony of Mr. Hurst that such was the manner
in which they communicated to him that the Blair place was
for sale. As to the citation from Shakespeare, we do not know
whether the character who is· quoted as saying,, "We offer
faire, take it advis·edly", was making an offer which he "ad~
vised'' or recommended the offeree to accept, or whethe!. he
was trying to rephrase ''Caveat Emptor''. In either case it is
not a citation of authority which gives us any help in this
matter.
It 1s not controverted that Mr. Hurst knew that Mr.
Eckersley ~ad the Blair place listed for sale. The only ques~
tion which must be decided is this: Was there sufficient evidence that Mr. Eckersley did not offer the Blair place for sale
to Mr. Hurst upon which the jury could find as they did?
Clearly not "all" of the evidence is as counsel for plaintiffs
views it. The transcript reveals ample evidence uhat Mr. Eckers~
ley did not offer the place to Mr. Hurst.
The trial Court instructed the jury that, "it is an offer
of property for s·ale if the property is presented for sale, or for
ac.ceptance of a sale, or for rejection ·of an offer .of sale".
Neither appellants nor respondents question that instruction.
There was ample evidence for the jury to fairly determine
that Mr. Eckersley, when he said, "This place is for sale. I
don't believe y-ou want this place. It is a man~killer. It is
killing 'Mr. Blair.'', was not presenting the Blair place for sale
to Mr. Hurst. There was enough evidence for them to fairly
determine that such a statement was not pres·enting it for acceptance of a sale. There was enough evidence for them to
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fairly determine that Mr. Eckersley, in that statement, and by
the way he made it, and in view of the circumstances under
which he made it, ruled out the likelihood that Mr. Hurst
would even consider it to be an offer which he need even bother
to reject.
If there 1s any cred1ble evidence upon which the jury
could have found as they did this Court will not disturb
their verdict.
Surely the jury were entitled to believe either Mr. Eckersley or Mr. Hurst on matters in which their testimony conflicted. They could consider and compare the demeanor and manner of testimony of Mr. Hurst, in his straightforward manner,
with rhat of Mr. Eckersley, with his "intimations" that Mr.
Hurst was interested, his "feeling" that Mr. Hurst knew certain
things, his apologetic volunteering, on examination by his own
counsel, that 'This is a sad occasion.'', in determining whether
they should find, as they did, that he did not offer to sell this
property to Mr. Hurst.
'Jlhere was ample evidence before the jury, introduced by
the plaintiffs themselves, that the efforts of the plaintiffs were
directed not to interesting Mr. Hurst in the Blair property,
but to selling him a ranch in Wyoming or Montana. The
jury could properly consider, and apparently did consider, the
whole of the conduct of the plaintiffs· in that regard in evaluating the casual remark of Mr. Eckersley that the Blair Place
was for sale, coupled with his negative comment that the place
was a man-killer, in their determination that Mr. Eckersley
did not offer it for sale to Mr. Hurst.
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The listing agreement presupposes that any "offer by the
plaintiffs to sell this property would be made in a manner
which would at least interest a buyer whq is· ready, able and
willing to buy. It does not carry the loophole that the communication of such information as the defendants gave could
be made in a manner to deter the supposed offeree from even
giving favorable consideration to the purported offer. The
consideration for the defendant's binding themselves to pay
a commission to the plaintiffs is the undertaking on the part
of the plaintiffs that they will use their skill, training, experience and abilities to try to sell the property, and that is as
much a part of the listing agreement as the provision for payment of commission in the event of a sale within 12 montlhs
to someone to whom they have "offered'' it. The jury could
properly consider the whole intendment of the listing agreement, and not just that portion which counsel for plaintiffs
sought to emphasize, in determining that the manner of acquainting Mr. Hurst witlh the fact that the pr-operty was for
sale was not in keeping with, and would not implement, the
purpose of the listing, that of the sale of the Blair property.
In view of all the evidence before them, the jury properly
found that plaintiffs did not offer the Blair place for sale to
Mr. Hurst, and the trial Court did not err in denying the motion for a new trial.

Respectfully suhmittied,

ALLEN L. HODGSON,
Attorney for Respondents.
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